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Abstract
Among downtowns of North American metropolitan regions, two have performed 
especially well in terms of the presence of employment, residential development 
and diversity of land uses over the last decades: those of Toronto and Chicago. Th is 
paper concentrates on the factors responsible for their success. It reviews the history 
of the two downtowns since World-War-II, giving special attention to the capacity 
‘macro-decisions’ have of creating path dependencies. Identifi ed macro-decisions 
include strategic investments in downtown-focussed public transit and improvements 
to the diversity and amenities of the downtowns. Th ere are important diff erences in 
the approaches taken in the two downtowns. Th ese relate in part to organizational 
specifi cities. If in Toronto institutional structures and political coalitions play a major 
role in explaining the adoption of policies favourable to the downtown, in Chicago 
it is the priorities of powerful mayors that loom largest. Th e paper proposes a multi-
causal model, which shows how numerous decisions of diff erent nature, along with 
their interactions and consequences, have contributed to positive downtown outcomes 
in the two cities. Th e main lesson from the two cases is that downtown success cannot 
be improvised as it is the outcome of long chains of policies, which interact positively 
with market trends, favouring core areas. 
Keywords:  Toronto, Chicago, downtowns, history
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Résumé
Parmi les centres-villes des régions métropolitaines nord-américaines, ceux de Toronto 
et Chicago se sont distingués, au cours des dernières décennies, par le maintien d’un 
fort niveau d’emploi, ainsi que par leur capacité de stimuler leur croissance résidentielle 
et d’accroître la diversité de leurs activités. Cet article se penche sur les facteurs qui 
ont contribué au succès des deux centres-villes. Il décrit leur histoire depuis la seconde 
guerre mondiale, prêtant une attention particulière à la mise en place de tendances à 
long terme. Les macrodécisions qui ont lancé ces tendances comprennent la création 
de réseaux de transports collectifs desservant les deux centres-villes, ainsi qu’une 
amélioration de la qualité de leur milieu de vie et un enrichissement de la diversité 
de leurs activités. Il y a d’importantes distinctions dans les mesures responsables du 
succès des deux centres-villes. Alors qu’à Toronto les structures administratives et les 
coalitions politiques ont joué un rôle de premier plan, à Chicago ce sont deux puissants 
maires qui ont été responsables des principales stratégies de revitalisation. L’article met 
de l’avant un modèle multi-causal expliquant l’évolution des centres-villes, qui identifi e 
les liens entre de multiples décisions ainsi que leurs conséquences. Les deux études de 
cas démontrent que le succès d’un centre-ville dépend non pas de stratégies isolées, 
mais plutôt d’une longue chaîne d’interventions s’arrimant aux tendances du marché 
et se déployant sur une longue durée.
Mots clés:  Toronto, Chicago, centres-villes, histoire
Introduction
Two downtowns of large North American metropolitan regions, those of Toronto 
and Chicago, have fared exceptionally well in terms of their capacity to retain a 
large employment base, achieve multi-functionality and attract new residents. Th ese 
downtowns have withstood the urban decentralization wave that has unfurled across 
the continent since World War II. Th e phrase ‘A City Th at Works’ has been associated 
with metropolitan governance in postwar Toronto as well as with Mayor Richard J. 
Daley’s ability to get things done in postwar Chicago. We transpose this expression 
to the downtowns of these cities (‘Downtowns that Work’) to refl ect their positive 
performance, in part a legacy of measures taken over the postwar period when the two 
cities ‘worked’.
Th e paper builds a conceptual framework highlighting multiple and intersecting 
circumstances that promote downtown development. Narratives of the evolution of 
the two downtowns and planning approaches adopted to further their development 
are interpreted from this multi-causal perspective. Our longitudinal study responds 
to calls for a ‘comparative (re)turn in urban studies’ by highlighting similarities and 
diff erences in the histories of the two downtowns, and distills lessons relating to 
their success (Ward 2008: 405). Th e case studies stress the need for a confl uence of 
several factors, notably past planning decisions, land-use and transportation patterns 
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at a metropolitan and downtown scale, favourable market circumstances and proactive 
planning, and thus point to the absence of a single policy wand capable of assuring 
the success of downtowns. Th e study has far-reaching planning implications, as the 
revitalization and expansion of downtowns along with the creation of sub-centres 
meant to operate as small-scale downtowns, which are at the heart of many central-
city and metropolitan-wide policies.
Downtowns that Work
What are the conditions for ‘successful’ downtown development in North America? 
Th e ability of downtowns to attract and retain people and businesses and to nurture an 
appealing cityscape cannot be presumed despite a much-heralded ‘return to the city’ 
(Birch 2009).  Well-functioning downtowns at a minimum host dense concentrations 
of a wide range of activities—offi  ces, hospitality services, retailing, institutions, 
cultural facilities, recreational establishments and housing—which benefi t from 
their functional complementarity and proximity to each other. Planning attempts 
to improve downtowns have taken multiple forms, such as major public investments 
(e.g. conference centres, concert halls, parks and sports stadia), clearance and heritage 
preservation (Ford 2003; Levine 1987; Robertson 1995). Results have been mixed, 
however. In an advanced state of depletion due to the impact of urban dispersion, 
many downtowns have failed to respond to planning stimuli.
Th e downtowns of Toronto and Chicago were selected because in the early 21st 
century they have maintained a high concentration of employment while becoming 
increasingly multi-functional. Th ey also share sustained development over much of 
the 1945-2015 period despite regional sprawl. Are these same downtown outcomes 
the result of similar or diff erent market trends and policies? 
Our exercise will demonstrate the need for a number of favourable conditions, 
including past policy decisions, urban dynamics, market trends, and on-going public 
sector decision-making that, if aligned, can sustain downtown growth in the face of 
continuing suburban dispersal. We begin constructing our multi-causal model by 
examining the enduring infl uence of macro-decisions of a planning nature or otherwise. 
Macro-decisions have the capacity to steer other decisions in a lasting way and thus 
launch path dependencies. Th e range of possibilities available at any given time is in 
large part dictated by the legacy of such decisions. Th eir infl uence is extended over 
time through the creation and modifi cation of institutions, laws, regulations and, with 
most relevance to this paper, urban form and dynamics, infrastructures and services 
(Pierson 2004). Th ey open up and close down options for the future. 
Macro-decisions create urban dynamics which, when validated by supportive 
demographic and economic tendencies, become entrenched over time. Mutually 
reinforcing land use and transportation interactions are resistant to modifi cation 
or reversal, and can either encourage or stymie the evolution of downtowns. Th e 
predominance in North America of automobile-oriented transportation systems tends 
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to promote decentralization and, therefore, the erosion of downtowns (Squires 2002). 
In contrast, a foremost comparative advantage of some downtowns is the existence of 
a synergy grounded in frequently repeated pedestrian-based interactions benefi ting 
diff erent downtown activities (Robertson 1993; Th omson 1977). Such a synergy is the 
off shoot of prior decisions conducive to a downtown concentration of activities and 
assuring that the presence of cars did not threaten the pedestrian environment.
Diff erent market trends aff ect the evolution of downtowns. Th ere is fi rst the 
economic performance and specialization of a metropolitan region, increasingly a 
function of its insertion within global economic networks. Th e better the performance 
of a metropolitan economy and the greater its specialization in sectors that generate 
core-area jobs and/or employ people attracted to downtown living, the stronger is 
the growth potential of its downtown area (Savitch and Kantor 2002). Market trends 
aff ecting downtowns are shaped by planning decisions such as those determining urban 
accessibility patterns. Th e economic vitality of a downtown is a function of accessibility 
(Lang, Sanchez and Oner 2009). Equally important are supply-side mechanisms 
(investment in downtown real estate and activities) that both accommodate and 
stimulate the economic activity of downtowns.
Public sector decision-making is the fi nal set of circumstances we discuss. Numerous 
variables shape public policies targeted at downtown areas and thereby aff ect their 
capacity of achieving development goals. Th e institutional architecture (itself a 
legacy of past macro-decisions), defi nes the role and power of diff erent political and 
administrative actors (Peters 2005). As expected, the electoral process and public sector 
reliance on resources generated by the private economy, along with resulting sensitivity 
to political or economic pressures from developers, major employers and community 
groups, infl uence the nature of downtown interventions. Th e fi scal dependence of 
municipal governments has been instrumental in forging regime-type coalitions, 
dominated by economically powerful actors (Stone 1989). Some of the downtown-
oriented public policies moulded by institutional architecture can achieve the status of 
macro-decisions, which tie back to the fi rst stage of the model.
Th e objective of understanding the development of downtowns involves 
consideration of diff erent factors present at diff erent times with diff erent intensities. 
Macro-decisions spawn urban dynamics, which in turn infl uence market trends within 
metropolitan regions. Planning strategies that value centralization must take these 
sets of conditions into consideration; the greater the departure from the momentum 
put in place by macro-decisions, urban dynamics and markets, the larger are the 
planning eff orts and resources required and the more uncertain are outcomes. Th e 
above discussion leads us to expect that the success of downtowns will be infl uenced 
not by one but by a multitude of historical, economic, urban and political factors, and 
that these factors will tend to align to generate block eff ects.
Th e paper departs from main trends within the literature on the evolution and 
revitalization of downtowns. Most research on North American downtowns can be 
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divided in two categories. Th ere are fi rst histories of downtown areas chronicling their 
emergence, decline and redevelopment. Attention in these narratives concentrates 
on the circumstances that have brought about these junctures in the evolution of 
downtowns (e.g. Abbott 1993; Cohen 2007; Fogelson 2001; Ford 2003). Th e focus in 
the second category of studies is on revitalization options. Th is literature focuses on 
the role in revitalizing downtowns of housing, cultural activities, historic preservation, 
transit access, walkability and the diversifi cation of activities (Birch 2009; Danielsen 
and Lang 2010; Gratz and Mintz 1998; Leinberger 2005; Levy 2013; Ryberg-
Webster and Kinahan 2014; Strom 2010). It also investigates the impact of planning 
processes on downtown outcomes (e.g. Mitchell 2001). Literature belonging to the 
second category typically relies on case studies to demonstrate the eff ectiveness of the 
revitalization methods they advocate.
In this paper we attempt to blend the two approaches. Th e seventy-year history 
of the downtowns under consideration will make it possible to take a wide view of 
conditions for downtown development. Th e historical narratives will allow us to expose 
connections between macro-decisions, urban dynamics, market trends and public 
sector decision-making. Our historical perspective will, we believe, off er a perspective 
on factors of revitalization that reaches beyond those typically put forth in second 
category downtown studies. We look at contributions of diff erent social processes to 
the long-term evolution of the two case studies and draw lessons from these fi ndings 
for downtown revitalization.
Case Studies and Method
Th e case studies consist of historical narratives assembled from planning documents, 
secondary sources, media coverage and population, employment and fl oor space 
statistics. Wherever possible we present comparative data. Comparability is, however, 
not always possible with statistics originating from two cities, countries and sets of 
government agencies. Diff erent time series and geographical defi nitions of downtown 
areas have proven to be especially challenging. 
Th e method used to delineate downtown Toronto and Chicago conforms to a 
broad defi nition of downtowns suited to our focus on multi-functionality. We fi rst 
identifi ed all contiguous areas where downtown-type activities (offi  ces, retailing, culture, 
public institutions, high-density housing) are concentrated in built environments 
exceeding metropolitan density norms. We then included medium-density residential 
areas within easy walking reach (500 metres) of these clusters of activities. Boundaries 
emanating from this formula were adjusted to account for census tract borders. Our 
approach has yielded two downtown areas of comparable size: 12.8 and 11.5 kms2 
respectively for Toronto and Chicago (see Figure 1). Because of the inclusion of their 
residential fringe, the size of our downtown areas tends to exceed most planning 
department delineations.  
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Defying Dispersion: 1945-1980 
Toronto
Although Toronto conformed to the pre-1950 North American centralized city 
model, its downtown area was relatively modest until the mid-1960s. As an urban 
area experiencing rapid growth in the postwar years, Toronto could have easily evolved 
into a weak-centred, dispersed metropolitan region, following the trajectory of most 
expanding metros across the continent. For a while, development tendencies pointed 
in this direction: very little offi  ce or retail construction took place downtown from 
the early 1930s to the early 1960s (Gad and Holdsworth 1984). Meanwhile, in the 
1950s other locations attracted development traditionally destined for the core—most 
glaringly, major head offi  ces. 
Public sector decisions taken over this period contributed to the long-term 
maintenance of centralization in Toronto despite ongoing suburbanization. First, only 
two expressways serve the downtown area. Original expressway plans were ambitious, 
but the Provincial Government’s 1971 decision to reject the most grandiose proposal, 
Figure 1: Downtown Toronto and Downtown Chicago
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the Spadina Expressway, in the face of widespread public protest ended expressway 
construction in the core, inner city and older suburbs (Nowlan and Nowlan 1970; 
Sewell 1993). 
It was rapid transit policies that most distinguished Toronto from the North 
American urban transportation norms of the 1950s and 1960s. Th e decision was taken 
in 1946 to dig a subway under Toronto’s main commercial street. It is noteworthy 
that this project was adopted in a climate of general apathy towards public transit 
across the continent as cities were attempting to better accommodate the automobile. 
Th ereafter, Metro Toronto, a regional government with planning jurisdiction over 
the cities that were amalgamated into the new City of Toronto in 1998, assured an 
ongoing extension of the subway system. In addition, commuter train services, all of 
which downtown oriented, were upgraded from the time the provincial government 
assumed their operation in 1967. 
Starting in 1965, a confl uence of events unfolded to foster wide-scale downtown 
redevelopment. Th e fi rst, the inauguration of a futuristic City Hall, was seen as a 
symbol of the entry of downtown Toronto in the modern age. Meanwhile, as Toronto 
consolidated its position as the centre of Canada’s expanding fi nancial sector, demand 
mushroomed for downtown offi  ce space in a location that combined prestige with 
accessibility to the diversity of skills available within the metropolitan labour pool 
(Bourne, Britton and Leslie 2011). It was also a time when major development 
companies became involved in the construction and management of large downtown 
offi  ce and retail complexes. Following in the steps of the Toronto Dominion Bank, 
which opened new downtown headquarters in 1967, all major Canadian banks 
built downtown offi  ces complexes over the next two decades. A large retail complex 
was the 1977 Eaton Centre, a 230-outlet galleria-type mall. Other offi  ce and retail 
developments followed in the wake of these fi rst-generation projects, including an 
underground network of shopping galleries interconnecting virtually all major 
downtown buildings. 
Th e rapid accretion of downtown offi  ce space raised concerns that the associated 
rise in commuting would soon exceed the capacity of existing and anticipated 
transportation infrastructures. Planners were also preoccupied with the tendency 
for new developments to accentuate the nine-to-fi ve administrative nature of the 
downtown, thus hampering the desired creation of a round-the-clock mixed-use 
district. Two plans, the 1977 City of Toronto Central Area Plan and the 1981 Metro 
Toronto Offi  cial Plan, called for changes in the trajectory of downtown development 
(Metro Toronto 1981; Toronto 1977). Ensuing zoning changes included FAR (fl oor 
area ratio) increments for new developments with a housing component. 
It was, however, in neighbourhoods abutting downtown that residential 
redevelopment was most intense from the late 1950s to the early 1970s. Housing 
construction in these areas was the outcome of two processes. One was urban renewal 
involving the construction of public housing projects. Residential redevelopment was 
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also market driven, taking the form of high-rise apartment buildings scattered in low-
rise residential neighbourhoods. An extreme case of residential redevelopment was St. 
James Town (just inside our broad defi nition of the downtown), a 1960s tower in the 
park project, housing approximately 20,000 residents in 19 public and private high-
rise buildings. Th e transformation of neighbourhoods close to the downtown by public 
and private high-rise residential structures angered citizen organizations. Protest 
against lax zoning led to the election of city councillors sympathetic to neighbourhood 
concerns, who eventually adopted plans and regulations that banned the construction of 
apartment towers in predominantly low-rise neighbourhoods (Caulfi eld 1974). With 
the restriction of housing construction in surrounding neighbourhoods, downtown 
Toronto began to attract the attention of residential developers. After losing residents 
steadily through the 1960s, downtown population decline levelled off  in the 1970s 
(see Table 1).
Chicago
Th e context for postwar downtown development in Chicago was one of dramatic 
deconcentration. White, middle-income households moved to the suburbs and were 
replaced by working-class African Americans. Assessments dropped, investment 
in centrally located residential neighbourhoods declined, and the City adopted 
a strategy of clearance that furthered population decline through the 1970s (see 
Table 1). Manufacturing, retail and offi  ce uses dispersed to suburban commercial 
nodes. Secondary employment sub-centres sprouted in the downtowns of older 
inner ring suburbs and then moved to freeway junctions, competing with the 
downtown (Pivo 1990).
Nonetheless, Chicago’s Loop1 remained the ‘command and control center 
for corporate and governmental institutions’ (Bennett 2010: 40). After almost two 
decades of little to no building, a downtown commercial boom was kicked off  when 
the Prudential Building—Chicago’s tallest offi  ce building to date—was completed in 
1955. While many attribute it to pent-up postwar demand, the boom of the 1960s was 
also the result of long-running Mayor Richard J. Daley’s ability to make the downtown 
more attractive to investors (Pacyga 2009). Th e fi rst articulation of the ‘city as regional 
center’ that he envisioned is contained in the 1958 Development Plan for the Central 
Area of Chicago, which also refl ects the vision of committed corporate and civic leaders 
(Rast 2011; Squires et al. 1987). 
Mayor Daley was able to implement many of the ideas in the Plan (e.g., 
McCormick Place, the University of Illinois at Chicago campus, federal buildings and 
plazas, numerous transportation projects) as he was a master at using federal funds 
for local development. He parlayed funds appropriated through Title I of the Housing 
Act of 1949 into several public sector-led urban renewal projects to stem middle-class 
suburbanization and white fl ight, and he formed the Department of City Planning 
and the Public Building Commission to assist him in these eff orts. He used money 
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Table 1: Population Change by Downtown, City and Region
Downtown
% Change
City of Toronto 1
% Change
Toronto 
Census 
M
etropolitan Area
% Change
Toronto
1951
108,823
1,117,472
1,176,622
1961
85,725
-21.2
1,618,787
44.9
1,733,108
47.3
1971
71,365
-16.8
2,086,015
28.9
2,628,250
51.7
1981
71,178
-0.3
2,137,395
11.7
2,998,945
14.1
1991
96,632
35.8
2,385,421
11.6
3,893,046
29.8
2001
117,824
21.9
2,481,494
4
4,682,897
20.3
2006
132,427
12.4
2,503,281
0.9
5,113,149
9.2
2011
163,194
23.2
2,615,060
4.5
5,583,064
9.2
Downtown
% Change
City of Chicago
% Change
Chicago 
M
etropolitan 
Statistical Area
% Change
Chicago
1950
57,358
3,620,962
5,761,484
1960
45,749
-20.2
3,550,404
-1.9
7,017,024
21.7
1970
38,382
-16.1
3,366,957
-5.2
7,886,829
12.4
1980
40,546
6
3,005,061
-10.7
8,052,932
2.1
1990
52,082
28.4
2,783,726
-7.4
8,182,076
1.6
2000
69,763
33.9
2,896,016
4.0
9,098,316
11.2
2010
109,501
56.9
2,695,598
-6.9
9,461,105
4.0
1 Population within the post-1998 City of Toronto boundaries. Th is territory was from 1954 to 1997 under the jurisdiction of M
etro Toronto a 
regional government. a second tier administration.
Sources: Statistics Canada, Census data; M
innesota Population Center. National H
istorical Geographic Information System: Version 2.0. 2011; 
and U.S. Census 2010. 
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made available by the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 to fund the expansion 
of public transit in the city, building new stations into the grid of the highway system 
(e.g. the Red Line) (Farmer 2011). Th e construction of major expressways such as the 
Congress (now Eisenhower) and Dan Ryan razed residential buildings on the fringes 
of the Loop but left the commercial core intact. Th e Plan also created a framework 
for public-private cooperation around downtown redevelopment between the business 
elite and a mayoral administration that had both strong ties to Washington and a 
political machine for implementation (Royko 1971). Specifi cally, private investment 
in the CBD was ‘contingent upon government action in the form of land assembly, 
transportation improvements, new public buildings, use of urban renewal powers, and 
other activities specifi ed in the Plan’ (Rast 2011: 597).  
Although the 1958 Plan was almost entirely focused on offi  ce and institutional 
uses, it did mention the goal of ‘housing for all income levels’ that could support a 
sizeable residential population in the Loop and adjoining areas. Two large, Le 
Corbusier-inspired housing projects were developed close to the Loop in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Th is period also witnessed an initial wave of private residential construction 
in the CBD north of the river, starting with upper-middle class projects like Marina 
City (1962) and Lake Point Tower (1968). Th ese developments were also part of a 
trend in housing tenure toward apartment ownership that began in the 1960s but was 
more fully realized in the mid-1970s as existing rental buildings converted to condos. 
Th e City, however, did not press forward with its goal of downtown housing 
throughout the 1960s. Th e silence on this front made the appearance of the Chicago 
21 Plan: A Plan for the Central Area Communities in 1973 all the more explosive. Th e 
main proposition of the Plan was to create ‘New Town’, an entirely new residential 
neighbourhood of 120,000 people on the unused railway yards just south of the Loop 
(Cohen and Taylor 2001). Th e Plan’s release coincided with the decline of Mayor 
Richard J. Daley’s urban development machine and a concomitant wave of civil rights 
activism (Bennett 2010). Coming off  several decades of slum clearance and ‘Negro 
Removal’, African-American and Latino leaders led low-income constituents in 
opposition to the Plan. Th e goal of extending the Loop southwards was interpreted 
as a mandate to displace low-income and minority residents and the small businesses 
serving their needs. It did not take long before activists saw some of their fears realized. 
Planning for Dearborn Park I, the city’s fi rst large-scale, low-rise downtown residential 
project in the CBD, began in 1974 (Wille 1998). Downtown residential uses were 
slow to follow the success of Dearborn Park and the early North Side towers. Yet 
few noticed their absence as the downtown experienced yet another round of offi  ce 
construction during the commercial real estate boom of the 1980s. 
Diversifi cation: 1980-2015 
Toronto
Downtown Toronto witnessed little offi  ce construction from the early 1990s to the 
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late 2000s. Several factors explain this hiatus. Th ere was fi rst the lingering eff ect of 
the early 1990s recession, the worst in Toronto since the Great Depression. It took 
a long time to return to normal occupancy rates after vacancy peaked during the 
recession. Reliance on bricks-and-mortar offi  ces was also reduced as more work was 
done at home or on the road (Scott and Williams 2005). Finally, downtown Toronto 
was impacted by a growing preference for low-density, automobile-oriented suburban 
offi  ce confi gurations due to their easy accessibility to proximate labour pools, cheaper 
building costs and lower suburban commercial tax rates (CUI 2013). Together, these 
trends were responsible for downtown employment stagnation from 1991 to 2006 (see 
Table 2).
Table 2: Downtown Employment, 1991-20081
Year Toronto Chicago
1991 393,600 457,640
1992 373,600 437,085
1993 368,200 428,801
1994 357,600 430,779
1995 358,900 434,395
1996 359,300 441,829
1997 369,900 449,666
1998 383,200 461,536
1999 404,400 470,135
2000 411,100 477,001
2001 397,900 476,940
2002 388,900 454,472
2003 380,200 435,277
2004 385,900 433,430
2005 388,700 435,166
2006 396,800 446,681
2007 415,200 453,924
2008 424,900 467,914
1 Th e availability of comparable data between the two downtowns accounts the focus of the table on these 
17 years.
Sources: Metro Toronto (various dates) Metro Facts. Toronto: Metro Toronto; Illinois Department of 
Employment Security Where Workers Work (2010)
Downtown residential development took an entirely diff erent trajectory. From the 
early 1980s considerable housing growth occurred in the downtown, leading to the 
ongoing high-rise condominium boom which unfurled from the early 2000s. Several 
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circumstances converged to fuel downtown condominium growth over this period. 
Th ere was fi rst a favourable economic climate throughout the 2000s accompanied by 
low interest rates. Moreover, high property values in the Toronto metropolitan region 
encouraged the construction and sale of high-rise condominium units. Notwithstanding 
the higher fl oor space cost of such units relative to other housing forms, it was possible 
for single-family-home owners to trade their house for a condo unit and be left with 
a substantial share of the proceeds from the sale. Small condos are also seen by young 
adults as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the housing market. In 2006, average 
household sizes in downtown Toronto were 1.6 persons compared to 2.8 for the 
broader Census Metropolitan Area, more were made up of young adults and half of 
all downtown residents held a university certifi cate or degree, while 34 percent of all 
regional residents did (Statistics Canada, 2006). Th e downtown Toronto condominium 
boom is also fuelled by domestic and international investors (Wintrob 2011). 
Th e active Toronto real estate scene is tied to the ongoing growth of the 
metropolitan region, whose population, fuelled by immigration, has increased annually 
by approximately 100,000. Other features of the metropolitan region also have 
a direct bearing on the downtown condo boom. As traffi  c congestion worsens and 
public transportation investment fails to keep pace with the expansion of the region, 
commuting becomes increasingly arduous. According to a recent comparative study of 
a sample of nineteen large metropolitan regions including Los Angeles, Chicago, New 
York and London, Toronto posted the longest average commuting time (Toronto Board 
of Trade 2010: 42-43). Th ere is thus a major incentive for people working downtown 
to live close to their employment. Animated streets and ample downtown shopping, 
recreational and cultural opportunities, represent other major draws, especially for 
young adults. 
Th e City has adopted a fl exible planning approach to stimulate reinvestment 
in underutilized edges of the downtown (Bounce 2004; Darchen 2013). An 
accommodating planning regime has also enabled the high-rise condo boom. Th e 
‘railway lands’, former marshalling yards between the fi nancial district and the 
waterfront, had been the object of redevelopment proposals since the late 1960s 
(MTPB 1970). Early concepts involving primarily offi  ce buildings were frustrated by 
the absence of a market suffi  cient to absorb the vast amount of fl oor space that could 
be supplied in such an extensive area. Market considerations along with Planning 
Department resistance to the height of the buildings under consideration delayed 
development. But from the early 2000s, Pacifi c Concord, a Hong Kong-based 
company, proceeded with the construction of 17 condo towers and a number of mid-
rise structures. Th e remainder of the railway lands was the object of condo tower 
development by other companies. 
Abetted by permissive zoning, high-rise condos were also erected in the rest of 
the downtown. Two matters raised in the 2004 City of Toronto Offi  cial Plan added 
weight to developers’ arguments for zoning amendments permitting higher condo 
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towers, which make these structures more profi table and, therefore, numerous. Th e 
fi rst was a strong stand in favour of downtown residential intensifi cation in order to 
achieve ‘accessibility through proximity.’ Th e second consisted in enhanced concern 
for design quality in proposed buildings (Toronto 2009: 2.7 and 3.9). Developers 
were then able to argue that the distinctive architecture of their proposed structure 
justifi ed exceeding height limits (Boudreau, Keil and Young 2009). At present, the 
City is considering further relaxing height restrictions along downtown arterials 
(Urban Strategies et al. 2010). 
Since 2009 four new offi  ce towers (with 26, 30, 43 and 51 storeys) have been 
erected in downtown Toronto and three more are under construction, thus ending 
the 20-year offi  ce construction hiatus. Th e renewed downtown offi  ce construction 
activity can be seen as tied to rising numbers of young professionals, actively sought 
by corporations, living nearby (CUI 2011). Just as offi  ces decamped to the suburbs 
to be close to their labour pool, some corporate tenants now opt for a downtown 
location for the same reason (Perkins 2012). Finally, new metropolitan-scale path 
dependencies favourable to downtown development may be taking form following the 
2006 adoption of the provincial Growth Plan (Filion 2012; Ontario 2006). Provincial 
policies stemming for this plan indeed limit outward urban development, partly 
through the creation of a green belt, and promote urban intensifi cation by directing 
growth towards existing built areas and especially new and existing multi-functional 
centres, including downtown Toronto.
Chicago
During the 1980s Chicago moved from a regional hub for local-serving companies 
to a global fi nancial and logistics centre. But many of these FIRE sector fi rms opted 
for the suburbs, which provided the Loop with dogged competition for offi  ce tenants. 
Th e Sears Tower, for example, sat half empty during the 1980s (and in 1995 even its 
namesake tenant relocated to the suburbs). As in Toronto, the offi  ce market crashed 
at the end of the decade and sustained high vacancies throughout the early 1990s. 
Moreover, the Loop offi  ce towers were poorly connected to other uses, bringing few 
positive spillovers to the immediate downtown. Th e CBD’s retail centre of gravity and 
hotels moved further north and at a greater distance from the offi  ce core. Meanwhile, 
the southern end of the Loop declined; the State Street Mall, a modernist pedestrian 
and transit corridor that opened in 1979, failed to stem the haemorrhage of retailers. 
Th e region’s middle class considered the Loop dangerous and worthy of only the 
briefest visit (Miller, 1996). 
When Mayor Richard M. Daley was elected in 1989, he inherited a Loop whose 
future as the commercial epicentre of the region was in question. He initiated his tenure 
with pronouncements about the need to make the downtown a 24-7 destination. His 
administration’s greatest planning contributions to the downtown were to encourage 
a diversity of land uses, including a substantial residential base downtown, and to 
develop amenities to attract tourists and new residents. He accomplished these goals 
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by following the model of public-private planning initiated under his father’s regime, 
one that accommodated developers with development rights, zoning changes and 
property tax subsidies for land assembly. During his term Tax Increment Financing 
(TIF) became a popular redevelopment instrument in depressed zones, especially in 
and around the Loop (Weber 2010). 
Th e City’s deft negotiation of air rights over railway tracks and yards and the fact 
that the historic core was ringed with aging infrastructure (and not residential uses) 
meant that it could build outwards and implement its grand visions for the downtown 
without inciting opposition. In some cases, it kept newly developable land as open 
space to provide an amenity to downtown residents and visitors. For example, the City 
opened Millennium Park in 2004 over an underground parking structure itself situated 
on top of railway tracks (Gilfoyle 2006). Th is massive public-private undertaking drew 
visitors in, helped connect the Loop to the attractions on the Lake (e.g. the museum 
‘campus’) and raised nearby property values as well as the profi le of downtown living 
(Goodman Williams and URS 2005). New residential construction sprouted up along 
the northern and southern borders of the Park.  
Unlike Toronto, Chicago experienced a sizeable offi  ce construction boom during 
the 2000s. When the dust settled in 2008, the city had added another twelve percent 
of new leasable space. Th e Loop was able to retain the almost half a million jobs 
that existed at the beginning of the boom (see Table 2). Despite tepid job growth, 
Chicago remained one of few regional offi  ce markets in the United States that was still 
core-dominated. In 2005 the Loop amounted to 49.3 percent of the Chicago regional 
market, the largest downtown share in the United States after New York City (Lang, 
Sanchez and Oner 2006). 
Chicago sustained an offi  ce core despite the fact that residential development 
outpaced downtown offi  ce construction. Almost 75 percent of the new built space 
added to the Central Area was residential, found in condos, apartment buildings and 
hotels. During the 2000s, developers added (or converted from rental) approximately 
35,000 new units downtown (US Bureau of the Census, 2010). Downtown Chicago 
experienced the largest numeric and percentage population increase among US 
metropolitan areas (US Bureau of the Census 2012; see Table 1).  As in Toronto, the 
new residents tended to work downtown and be younger, more affl  uent and educated 
than the population of the metropolitan region (Lachman and Brett 2011). 
At a metropolitan scale, population both recentralized in the core and decentralized 
to sprawling, rapidly growing exurbs, bypassing many older, inner-ring communities. 
As in Toronto, such movement led to traffi  c congestion and longer drive times; between 
1982 and 2005, the hours of congestion-related delays per traveler in the Chicago area 
increased annually from 15 hours to 46 hours (Texas A&M Transportation Institute 
2007). Th e second worst commute times in the country and high gasoline price 
provided good reasons for area residents to live downtown. 
Historically the downtown has enjoyed superior transit access relative to the 
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suburbs with the legacy hub-and-spoke systems focused on moving people toward the 
core. But this system, the second largest in the United States, found itself at capacity at 
a time when federal operating support was cut and local fi nancing (regional sales and 
city real estate transfer taxes) decreased (Farmer 2011). Th e downtown has become 
more walkable and transit accessible, but mode choice still favours the automobile. 
Moreover several of the new transit planning initiatives, such as express train access 
from the downtown to the city’s two airports, are ‘geared to the logistical and exchange 
demands of foreign direct investors, tourist spaces or socioeconomically affl  uent groups’ 
(Graham and Marvin 2001: 100)—particularly new downtown residents (Farmer 
2011). Funding for such public investments has dried up in the wake of the Great 
Recession triggered in 2008.
A Tale of Two Downtowns: Conditions for Success
We now discuss how conditions for downtown development introduced in the 
multi-causal model account for the evolution of the two downtowns (see Figure 2 
for a summary). At the outset of the postwar period, downtown Chicago was more 
advantaged than downtown Toronto. Downtown Chicago enjoyed an imposing 
concentration of commercial and residential land use along with a core-focussed 
rapid transit system. Set in a much smaller metropolitan region before the war (the 
metropolitan Toronto population was only 856,000 in 1931 while Chicago had then 
reached 4.4 million), downtown Toronto had not achieved such a critical mass, which 
partly explains its hesitant trajectory over the 1950s and 1960s as decentralization 
pressures mounted (Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1931; US Bureau of the Census 
1932). Also, downtown Toronto could not count on as large a transit-oriented 
catchment area as Chicago did. But these downtown Toronto disadvantages were 
compensated by judicious macro-decisions—in particular the building of a subway, 
the extension of commuter rail services and the New City Hall—which provided 
conditions for accelerated downtown development from the mid-1960s onwards. In 
both cities, macro-decisions favoured downtown development throughout the study 
period: public transit expansions, policies encouraging multi-functionality and the 
creation of amenities like Chicago’s Millennium Park.
Th e two downtowns were also spared interventions that proved to be deleterious 
to the evolution of other downtowns. In neither case was the downtown bisected by 
expressways, large parking lots or mass clearance (without imminent redevelopment). 
In both, highways were routed around the exterior of the core and public transit 
investment prevented the two downtowns from having to devote most of their space 
to vehicles. Chicago, however, does provide considerably more downtown automobile 
access than Toronto (34 expressway lanes crossing a cordon traced two kilometres 
beyond downtown boundaries versus 12 in Toronto). But the impact of the car on the 
downtown is mitigated by the decking of some roads and the provision of parking at 
its edges and below ground. Th e upshot is an environment that is generally favourable 
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to pedestrian-based synergies, even if, as noted, the main downtown Chicago offi  ce 
and retail concentrations are separated from each other (a situation that improved with 
the last construction boom). Th e preservation of the downtown fabric has encouraged 
dynamics supportive of development. 
Planning interest in the two downtowns was sustained throughout the study 
period by rewards for city administrations stemming from downtown development. 
In both cities the downtown indeed represented the foremost economic development 
asset, a major source of tax revenue and a key component of metropolitan- and city-
wide planning strategies promoting intensifi cation and reduced reliance on the car. 
Fortunately, planning interventions for the most part heeded conditions required to 
secure downtown development.
Turning to market trends, as second-tier global cities Toronto and Chicago 
attracted corporate headquarters and ancillary services, along with health, education, 
cultural and recreational establishments. Many of these activities were lured downtown 
by their ability to draw from a metropolitan-wide labour pool, their functional synergies 
and the prestige of this location. Both cities have avoided extreme housing and offi  ce 
prices registered in fi rst-tier centres, such as New York City, making it possible to 
target a wider market of potential downtown residents and investors. Continued 
demand for fl oor space and interest in the construction, acquisition and renovation 
of income-generating properties created positively reinforcing dynamics within these 
districts. Older low-rise and street-oriented structures maintained their value and thus 
escaped being turned into parking lots as in less prosperous downtowns. Such a built 
environment provides the connective tissue that encourages pedestrian movement and, 
therefore, inter-activity synergies, and thus attracts even more development. 
Moreover, young professionals employed downtown often exhibit a propensity 
for downtown living. Th ey are particularly appreciative of the diverse cultural and 
recreational environment of large and active downtowns (Florida 2004). Th eir taste 
for downtowns may have been acquired during their university student years. Th ere 
are sixteen college campuses in downtown Chicago and three in downtown Toronto, 
including the University of Toronto St. George Campus with 56,900 students. 
Households living downtown in both Chicago and Toronto are smaller, more educated 
and wealthier than city averages (in Toronto they are also younger, while in Chicago 
slightly older) (US Bureau of the Census 2010). Chronic traffi  c congestion and public 
transit overcrowding also enhance the appeal of living close to work and downtown 
amenities. 
Market trends also unfolded as they did because of supply-side factors, such as 
development formulas capable of accommodating new residents and business tenants. 
In both downtowns large development companies erected offi  ce and retail complexes, 
and easy access to consumer credit fuelled condominium development. However, 
construction cycles in the two cities were not fully synchronized. Th e 1950s and the 
2000-2008 period witnessed downtown offi  ce growth in Chicago not Toronto, and 
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since 2008 downtown Toronto has experienced both a condominium construction 
boom and active offi  ce development, fuelled partly by positive interactions between 
downtown housing and jobs, while construction stalled in downtown Chicago, beset 
by the 2008 US fi nancial and property meltdown.
Th e narratives are also in agreement over the relation between public policy 
and the market. In both cities policy interventions mostly accommodated prevailing 
market trends. Attempts at modifying such trends were confi ned to the provision of 
incentives (mainly amenities, subsidies and accessibility advantages) to nudge them in 
favour of downtown locations. Policies targeted at both downtowns attracted offi  ce 
development when offi  ce employment exploded as consumer and producer services 
took a growing place within the economy. Th ey also provided the infrastructural and 
regulatory foundation for the recent waves of condo construction, fuelled by low 
interest rates, foreign investors and the appeal of downtown living for diff erent social 
groups, above all, Generation Y professionals (Birch 2005; 2009). In contrast, attempts 
at modifying prevailing market tendencies were either weak, unsuccessful or absent. 
For example, in neither downtown was the objective of housing diverse income groups 
attained. Condo developers narrowly targeted profi table markets, and little was done 
to correct the skewed social makeup that ensued (Winsa 2010).
Meanwhile, the institutional architecture of municipal governments accounts 
for important distinctions in decision-making processes, which are echoed in the 
categories of actors emphasized in these narratives. Th e Chicago story focuses largely 
on the Daley dynasty whereas the Toronto case highlights organizational actors. Such 
a perspective is consistent with Toronto’s weak mayor system and, over several decades, 
the infl uence of Metro Toronto on regional planning and development. Powerful 
individuals certainly left a deep mark on Toronto development (most notably, Fred 
Gardiner, the 1953-1961 Metro Toronto Chair), but their impact on the trajectory 
of the downtown pales in comparison to that which Daley father and son had on 
the Loop. It was to be expected that in a city like Chicago, with its strong mayor 
system and well-oiled political machine, substantial power would be vested in elected 
leaders. Th ese leaders did not go at it alone but worked with infl uential downtown 
non-governmental organizations such as the Chicago Central Area Committee and 
the Chicago Loop Alliance. Common downtown development objectives between the 
business community and the Daley administrations, the existence of formal and durable 
communication channels as well as the success of joint projects involving the public 
and private spheres point to the existence of downtown regimes in Chicago (Stone 
1989). Th e situation is not so clear in Toronto although signs of collusion between 
the public sector and developers abound in the redevelopment of the waterfront (the 
southern portion of the downtown). Th e less personifi ed nature of the Toronto political 
life and its oscillation between right- and left-leaning administrations since the late 
1960s provide less evidence of enduring regimes. 
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Conclusion: Lessons from the Two Downtowns
Th e paper has attempted to paint a big picture of conditions aff ecting downtown 
development. It has shown how such development is infl uenced by historical 
circumstances and diff erent facets of society. Such is the case of: macro-decisions, 
as those that have favoured public transit development, which set contexts for other 
sources of infl uence on downtowns; urban dynamics, as downtown synergistic eff ects; 
market trends, including globalization, the rise of the fi nancial sector and the popularity 
of condos; and fi nally, public-sector decision-making, which has accommodated and 
stimulated downtown growth.
By combining a historical approach with the identifi cation of conditions 
favouring downtown development, the paper breaks with the tendency for the 
literature to separate these two perspectives on downtowns. Th e historical orientation 
of the paper made it possible to identify long-term and broad-scale downtown 
development conditions involving diff erent scales of society. Our comparative study 
thus demonstrates that downtown development cannot be improvised as it is driven 
by multiple factors, many of which are the legacy of past macro-decisions. We have 
also found that by dint of their interconnection, these factors tend to function as a 
block. All the factors we discussed were aligned to promote the growth of the two 
downtowns, but it is easy to envision how under diff erent circumstances, as in fully 
dispersed metropolitan regions, they could have just as eff ectively stymied downtown 
development. Th e study thus casts doubt on the effi  cacy of downtown development 
strategies that run counter to the grain of market trends and transportation-land use 
dynamics fostered by past macro-decisions. It is not that the paper disagrees with the 
downtown revitalization instruments commonly advanced in the literature, but rather 
that it takes the view that these instruments should be considered within their broad 
societal context. Th e Toronto and Chicago cases do, however, cast doubt on ‘silver 
bullet’ solutions to downtown revitalization put forth by some of the literature on 
downtowns.
Notes 
1Th e Central Business District, called the ‘Central Area’ by city planners, extends 
roughly from Lake Michigan on the east to the Chicago River on the west, from 
Chicago Avenue to Roosevelt Road on the south.  Th e formal ‘Loop’ is a smaller sub-
area of the CBD, namely that which is surrounded on all sides by the elevated train 
tracks downtown route.  However, through common parlance, the Loop has come to 
refer to the city’s entire CBD and, with the exception of when we present statistical 
data, we also use this broad meaning.
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